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Abstract
We explore which nancial constraints matter the most in the choice of becoming
an entrepreneur. We consider a randomly assigned welfare program in rural Mexico
and show that cash transfers signicantly increase entry into entrepreneurship. We
then exploit the cross-household variation in the timing of these transfers and nd
that current occupational choices are signicantly more responsive to the transfers
expected for the future than to those currently received. Guided by a simple occu-
pational choice model, we argue that the program has promoted entrepreneurship
by enhancing the willingness to bear risk as opposed to simply relaxing current
liquidity constraints.
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11 Introduction
Entrepreneurship is considered a fundamental aspect in the process of development (Haus-
mann and Rodrik [2003]; Ray [2007]; Naud e [2010]), while at the same time being often
hindered by nancial constraints (Banerjee and Duo [2005]; Levine [2005]). Hence, one
way in which access to nance may promote economic development is by allowing some
poor individuals the possibility to set up their own business (Banerjee [2003]; Karlan and
Morduch [2009]).
Understanding the link between improved access to nance and occupational choices
poses however some serious challenges. First, such an improvement seldom occurs in
isolation from other changes in the economy, which makes it hard to empirically estimate
its eects. Moreover, and perhaps even more fundamentally, occupational choices may be
determined by several nancial constraints, for example concerning households' ability to
save, borrow and get insurance against income shocks. One would then like to open the
box of \access to nance" and understand which of the various nancial constraints binds
in a given situation. This is often complicate but obviously key for the interpretation of
the eects and the design of eective policies.
This paper takes a step along these lines by asking whether nancial constraints
matter and which nancial constraints matter the most in the choice of becoming an
entrepreneur. We rst exploit a random variation in household income to show that -
nancial constraints prevent some individuals the possibility to become entrepreneurs. We
next decompose nancial constraints by distinguishing in particular whether individuals
refrain from becoming entrepreneurs as they lack enough liquidity to undertake some
initial capital investment or rather as they lack the ability to insure their income against
the risk posed by entrepreneurial returns. We develop a simple model to highlight how
liquidity and insurance constraints respond dierently to the time prole of expected
income shocks. We then exploit the variation in the timing of these shocks in order to
evaluate the relative importance of these two constraints in our setting.
More specically, we exploit the welfare program Progresa, which targets poor house-
holds in rural Mexico and provides cash transfers conditional on their behaviors in health
and children education. While Section 2 provides a more detailed description of the
program, we here stress some features which make it interesting for our exercise. First,
the timing of access into Progresa has been randomized, thereby providing us a reliable
control group to estimate its eects on occupational choices. Second, transfers are ad-
ministered for an extended and predictable time period and, albeit partly conditional
on schooling behaviors, they typically represent a sizable increase in households' wealth.
Moreover, and perhaps most importantly for our purposes, their magnitude and time
2prole vary substantially according to household demographics; as a result, households
face dierent (and partly exogenous) shocks to their current liquidity and to their ability
to insure against future income uctuations.
We start our empirical analysis by comparing households in treated and control com-
munities; we show that living in a treated community signicantly increases the prob-
ability of entering self-employment both from salaried work and from unemployment.
Furthermore, after a series of test, we rule out that the fact that transfers are conditional
on sending children to school may explain our results (as for example it may induce a
reallocation of labor within the household). Hence, we interpret the treatment impacts as
the result of income shocks and thus as (indirect) evidence that households face nancial
constraints.
We then exploit the fact that, as mentioned, treated households face dierent time
proles of cash transfers. In particular, the educational scholarship they are entitled
to receive in a given year varies substantially with the number, grade and gender of
their children. Slight cross-household variations in these characteristics might induce
signicant dierences in the amount of current and future transfers. We then ask whether
the choice of becoming entrepreneur in the current period is more responsive to the
transfers currently received or to those expected for the future.
We motivate our analysis by developing a simple occupational choice model in which
individuals may face liquidity or insurance constraints. If wealth cannot be freely allo-
cated across periods, since for example households cannot borrow, current and future
transfers have dierent eects on the choice of becoming entrepreneur. The transfers
currently received are better suited to help incurring start-up costs and so they are more
important if liquidity constraints are binding. Conversely, future transfers are better
suited to provide insurance against future income drops due to business failure and so
they have stronger eects if insurance constraints are binding.
We then test empirically whether it is the amount of current transfers or the amount
of future transfers which matters the most in the choice of becoming entrepreneur. In
order to do so, we rst rule out that the very same household characteristics which
determine the prole of transfers determine also occupational choices. We then show
that the probability to become entrepreneur in the current period is signicantly more
responsive to the amount of transfers expected for the near future than to the amount
currently received. This result is robust in various specications, in which we control for
example for the total amount of transfers received within a given time horizon.
In our view, these results tend to support the hypothesis that the program has been
eective in promoting entrepreneurship as it has relaxed insurance constraints as opposed
to simply relaxing current liquidity constraints. While one may think of alternative
3stories whereby both current and future transfers matter (for example, future transfers
may be used as collateral for moneylenders; or future investments may be needed to
keep up with the business needs), it is hard to explain that future transfers matter more
based on liquidity constraints. This may suggest that nancial barriers to entry into
self-employment are not the most important obstacle in our setting (see McKenzie and
Woodru [2006] for similar evidence on micro-enterprises in urban Mexico). Instead, the
possibility to better insure against future income uctuations may be what induces some
salaried individuals to undertake the risky choice of setting up a business.
This paper builds on the literature on the eects of improved access to nance on
occupational choices. Exploiting income shocks, Holtz-Eakin, Joulfaian and Rosen [1994]
and Blanchower and Oswald [1998] show that having received an inheritance increases
the probability of being or remaining self-employed. In experimental settings, de Mel,
McKenzie and Woodru [2008] consider a sample of individual who already have a busi-
ness in Sri Lanka and show that a random prize in cash or in kind considerably boosts
their prots. More generally, a substantial literature has explored the eects of improved
access to credit and to insurance (see e.g. Besley [1995] and Banerjee [2003] for reviews).
Experimental evidence along these lines is however still scarce and very recent (see Baner-
jee et al. [2009] and Zinman and Karlan [2009] for evidence on micro-credit in India and in
the Philippines, respectively, and Gin e and Yang [2009] for evidence on weather insurance
in Malawi). Moreover, despite liquidity and insurance constraints are often interrelated
(Ray [1998]), little has been done to try separating their eects, which is the main focus
of our paper. One notable exception is Dercon and Christiaensen [2007], who distinguish
seasonal credit constraints from inter-temporal constraints related to risk on fertilizer
adoption in rural Ethiopia. Finally, in spite of the substantial body of research related
to Progresa and its experimental design, to our knowledge no study has explicitly looked
at the eects of the cash transfer on occupational choices. Related and complementary
evidence is provided in Skouas and Di Maro [2008] who study the incentive eects of
Progresa on adult labor supply and in Gertler, Martinez and Rubio-Codina [2006], who
show that the program increased productive investments and so long-term welfare.
2 Data
2.1 Program Description
Launched in Mexico in 1997, Progresa is a large scale welfare program mainly aimed at
improving health and human capital accumulation in the poorest rural communities.1 It
1The program is currently ongoing under the name Oportunidades.
4provides households with conditional cash transfers targeted to specic behaviors in nutri-
tion, health and education. Initially, 506 villages were selected to be part of the program
evaluation sample. Within those, 320 villages were randomly allocated to the treatment
group and 186 villages to the control group. As we show in Table 1, randomization has
been successful in attaining balanced treatment and control populations. Among several
individual, household and village characteristics, none displays statistically signicant
baseline dierences.
Eligible households in treatment communities start receiving benets in March-April
1998; whereas eligible households in control communities were not incorporated until
November 1999.2 Cash transfers from Progresa are given bimonthly to the female head
of eligible households and they come in two forms. The rst is a xed food stipend of
105 Pesos per month conditional on family members obtaining preventive medical care.3
The second is an educational scholarships which is provided for each child who is less
than 18 years old and enrolled between the third and the ninth grade, conditional on
attending school a minimum of 85% of the time and not repeating a grade more than
twice. Scholarship amounts vary between 81 and 269 Pesos per month per child, they
increase with school grade and, in grades seventh to ninth, they are larger for girls than
for boys.4 Overall transfer amounts can be substantial: median benets are 176 Pesos
per month (roughly 18 USD in 1998), equivalent to about 28% of the monthly income of
beneciary families.
2.2 Sample Description
In our empirical analysis, we exploit a baseline survey conducted in October 1997 and
a series of Household Evaluation Surveys collected every six months starting in October
1998 for a total of ve waves after the baseline. These surveys include socioeconomic
characteristics at the individual level for 24,077 households, of which about 53% are
classied as eligible.
We mostly focus on eligible households during the experimental period: in addition
to the baseline, we employ the rst three waves of the follow-up surveys, from October
2The status of eligible household is based on a welfare index built on asset holdings in the baseline
and it was intended to remain unchanged for the entire duration of the program. However, around 3,000
households were classied as non-poor in the baseline but were later re-classied as eligible. In order to
avoid arbitrary classications, we exclude them from our analysis (results are unchanged once we include
them).
3These gures are expressed in current Pesos as of the second semester of 1998. Transfer size has
been increased over time in order to adjust for ination.
4Specically, an household is entitled to receive 81 Pesos per month for each child enrolled in the
third grade. The corresponding amounts for the following grades are respectively 91, 116, 146, 214, 224
and 239 for males and 91, 116, 146, 224, 249 and 269 for females. In our sample period, no educational
trasfers are given before the third grade and after the ninth grade.
51998 to October 1999. Program take-up is remarkably high in this sample: 94% of
the treated households and 96% of the control households are reported receiving positive
transfers within 18 months since program oering. Sample attrition is low (11%) and non
response in the occupational choice somewhat larger (17%); however, none are related to
the treatment assignment.
In the baseline, we have information on the main occupation of 20,770 eligible adult
individuals (18 years old or more). We mainly concentrate on the ows into entrepreneur-
ship, i.e. on those individuals who are either salaried or report no paid occupation (we
refer to them as unemployed) in the baseline and who become entrepreneurs in the follow-
up period. Amongst those residing in control villages, 4% become entrepreneur during
this period (mostly self-employed), of which roughly 25% were unemployed in the baseline
and 20% are women.
A distinctive features of new entrepreneurs is their engagement in micro-business
activities not (directly) related to agriculture: 11% of new entrepreneurs declare to be
engaged in activities like handicraft, sewing clothes and domestic services, whereas the
corresponding share for salaried workers is only 3%. Moreover, we note that 34% of
new entrepreneurs have more than one paid occupation vis- a-vis 8% of salaried workers.
This is common in many developing settings, and it is typically interpreted as an income
smoothing strategy (see e.g. Morduch [1995], Banerjee and Duo [2008]). Indeed, also
in our sample, new entrepreneurs face a substantially higher volatility of labor income in
their primary occupation, which may increase their need for self-insurance.5
3 Entrepreneurship and Financial Constraints
Random treatment assignment implies that a simple comparison of treated-control mean
outcomes will likely provide an unbiased estimate of the program impacts. However, we
additionally control for several socioeconomic characteristics that may aect occupational
choices so as to improve the power of the estimates and check the robustness of our
ndings. Moreover, although villages were randomly assigned to the treatment, data are
unlikely to be independent across individual observations. In particular, occupational
choices of individuals in the same village may be correlated as they share background
characteristics and are exposed to the same market environment and natural shocks. In
this section, we rst introduce a standard reduced-form empirical framework to evaluate
whether the exposure to the treatment induces some individuals to become entrepreneur.
We then provide some additional evidence to suggest that our eects stem from individual
5The standard deviation of monthly labor income is 84% of the sample mean for entrepreneurs vis- a-
vis 60% for salaried workers.
6responses to the cash transfers rather than to the conditions (such as schooling behaviors)
attached to these transfers.
3.1 Treatment Impacts
Consider an individual i who is either salaried worker or unemployed in the baseline and
let ne
i;t be a dummy equal to one if the individual has become entrepreneur in a given
program wave t and zero otherwise. Suppose ne
i;t is determined by the latent variable
nei;t; which denotes individual i's probability of becoming entrepreneur. We estimate
regressions of the following form:
nei;t = Tl + X
0
i;t0 + t + s + i;t; (1)
where Tl represents the Progresa experimental treatment assignment at the locality level
l and the vector Xi;t0 denotes a set of pre-determined covariates at the individual, house-
hold and locality level: individual age, gender, education, income, spouse main occupa-
tion, household wealth and demographic composition, village shares of entrepreneurs and
proxies for agricultural risk. We also include wave dummies t and state dummies s.6 In
order to take into account the potential intra-village correlation of i;t mentioned above,
we cluster standard errors at the village level.
Table 2 reports probit marginal eects of the program on the transition into en-
trepreneurship.7 Treatment impacts appear to be both statistically and economically
signicant. As shown in columns (1) and (2), living in a treated community increases
the probability of entering self-employment by 0.7 percentage points. This represents
an increase of 19% with respect to the counterfactual sample averages (equal to 4%).
In columns (3)-(6), we show that the treatment signicantly increases the probability of
entry into entrepreneurship both from salaried work and from unemployment. In relative
terms, the eects across subsamples are of comparable magnitudes: having access to this
stable source of extra income increases the likelihood to become entrepreneur of about
20% in the program period.
As further evidence that the above results are due to the treatment, we also include the
period in which control villages are incorporated into the program (survey waves 4 and 5),
and we slightly modify equation (1) so as to allow for interaction eects of the treatment
indicator with each survey wave dummy. The results provided in Table 3 (columns 1-
2) show that indeed treated-control dierences tend to vanish once the control group is
incorporated. We also investigate whether our results may be driven by a pure demand
6We cannot specify xed eects at a more disaggregated geographical level -say, municipality or
village- since this would imply loosing the exogenous variation induced by the experiment.
7All our results are robust if we instead use a Linear Probability Model.
7eect, whereby treated villages are richer and so have a higher demand for entrepreneurs.
If this were the case, the treatment eect would hold for all households in a treated
village, whether eligible for the program or not. The results provided in columns (3)
and (4) do not support this hypothesis: there are no treated-control dierences for non-
eligible individuals. It appears that being entitled to receive the treatment, as opposed
to simply living in a treated village, is what drives our eects. This result also tends to
exclude within-village spillovers between eligible and non-eligible households in the choice
to become entrepreneur.
3.2 Conditionality
As described in Section 2, cash transfers are conditional on health and schooling be-
haviors. In particular, the requirement of sending children to school may have a direct
eect on occupational choices: for example, as children become less likely to work at
home, mothers may have to quit a salaried job and turn to self-employment in search
for exible working hours or home working. This however seems unlikely to drive our
results. First, among those who were salaried and became entrepreneurs in treated vil-
lages, only 6% have children who returned to school in the program period, of which only
5% are women. Moreover, as shown in Table 4, we nd no dierential program impacts
on individuals for whom, according to a series of pre-program characteristics, we expect
conditionality to be more or less binding.8
We also notice that if individuals were pushed into entrepreneurship because of con-
ditionality, we would expect their labor supply to change and in general their welfare
to decrease. The results presented in Table 5, however, oer little support to this hy-
pothesis. Despite these estimates should be interpreted as simple correlations, as the
choice of becoming entrepreneur is itself dependent on the treatment, they show that
new entrepreneurs in treated villages have signicantly higher labor earnings and higher
non-food expenditures (columns 1-2), not signicantly dierent food consumption and
labor supply (columns 3-5), and they are less likely to be engaged in a second paid
occupation (column 6).9
8Specically, we consider those who were working longer hours at the baseline, females, those who
had eligible children not enrolled in school (who had to actually change their behavior in order to receive
the treatment), those who had eligible children only in primary school age vs. those who had female
children in secondary school age (enrollment in primary school is very high irrespective of the treatment,
while the treatment has a bigger eect on female secondary schooling; see Schultz [2004]).
9These results come from estimating, for each of output yi;t; the parameter  in the following equation:
yi;t = Tl + nei;t + Tl  nei;t + X
0
i;t0 + ui;t:
A similar strategy is used to get a sense of how new entrepreneurs invest the money. We notice in Table
6 that there is no evidence of increased investment in agricultural activities, such as acquisition of land,
8Taken together, this evidence tends to rule out that conditionality is driving our
results, so we can interpret the program impacts as the result of an income shock and
thus as (indirect) evidence that households face nancial constraints.
4 Liquidity and Insurance Constraints
Absent the program, individuals may refrain from becoming entrepreneurs for at least two
reasons. First, they may face liquidity constraints which prevent them from undertaking
some initial capital investment. The program would then promote entrepreneurship by
increasing households' current liquidity. Second, individuals may prefer avoiding the
risk associated with entrepreneurial returns. In this case, by providing transfers for an
extended and predictable period of time, the program would promote entrepreneurship by
increasing households' ability to cope with future income uctuations. In this section, we
rst develop a simple model to highlight how liquidity and insurance constraints respond
dierently to the time prole of expected income shocks. We show that, under standard
assumptions, the choice of becoming entrepreneur is more responsive to the amount of
transfers currently received if liquidity constraints are binding, while it is more responsive
to the amount of transfers expected for the future if insurance constraints are binding.
We then empirically explore these mechanisms by taking advantage of a second source of
variation. As described in Section 2, beyond random treatment assignment, households
dier in the magnitude and time prole of the transfers they are entitled to, as determined
by the number, grade and gender of their children. We can then test whether new
entrepreneurs are more responsive to the amount of money currently received or to those
expected for the near future.
4.1 A Simple Occupational Choice Model
Consider a population of individuals who are heterogeneous in their initial wealth a and in
their risk aversion r, drawn respectively by smooth distributions F and G with density f
and g. Individuals live for two periods. In the rst period, they choose their occupation:
either they become self-employed, which requires a xed investment of k units of capital,
or they become salaried. In addition, they choose the amount of wealth they wish to
transfer from period 1 to period 2: We denote with se the amount of savings decided by
an individual in case he becomes entrepreneur and with sw the amount decided in case
animals or agricultural expenditures or production. On the other hand, there is evidence of increased
nonagricultural activities, in particular carpentry and handicraft.
9he becomes a worker. We do not allow borrowing and so impose
s
w  0 and s
e  0, (2)
and we normalize the returns to saving to one.10 In the second period, individuals enjoy
the returns from their occupation. The self-employed get y with probability p and zero
otherwise; salaried workers get a xed wage w, where
py   k > w: (3)
Savings and occupation are chosen in order to maximize
u(x1) + E[u(x2)];
where E[:] is the expectation operator and x1 and x2 denote consumption in period 1 and
2. We make the standard assumption that u exhibits decreasing absolute risk aversion
(DARA) and for simplicity we abstract from time discounting. Finally, irrespective of
their choices, individuals are entitled to cash transfers C1 in period 1 and C2 in period 2.
An individual becomes entrepreneur if his expected utility exceeds what he would







As standard in this class of models (see e.g. Kihlstrom and Laont [1979]), there exists a
threshold level of risk aversion r such that those with r  r prefer being entrepreneurs.
We are interested in exploring how the equilibrium share of self-employed, denoted






(a   k   s
e + C1)   u
0
(a   s







e + y + C2) + (1   p)u
0
(s
e + C2)   u
0
(s
w + w + C2): (5)
4.1.1 Equivalence between current and future transfers
To set a benchmark, consider rst those individuals for whom borrowing constraints in
(2) do not bind. These individuals set sw such that their marginal utility is equalized
10Our results would hold with less extreme assumptions on borrowing constraints. The case of saving





w + C1) = u
0
(s
w + w + C2); (6)
and in the same way they choose se such that
u
0
(a   k   s
e + C1) = pu
0
(s
e + y + C2) + (1   p)u
0
(s
e + C2): (7)







and so their occupational choice respond in the same way to current and future transfers.
This result is not surprising. Those individuals who can optimally allocate wealth across
periods see no fundamental dierence between the transfers they have received today and
those they known they will receive tomorrow.
We do not expect however this to be the case for everyone in our population. Bor-
rowing constraints are widely documented (restricting to developing countries, see the
surveys in Banerjee [2003] and Karlan and Morduch [2009]), and these constraints break
the equivalence between current and future transfers. We can then compare the eects
of these transfers in two extreme cases: one in which there are only liquidity constraints
(k > 0 and individuals are risk neutral) and one in which there are only insurance con-
straints (k = 0 and individuals are risk averse).
4.1.2 Liquidity constraints
Consider rst the case in which all individuals are risk neutral. In this case, due to (3),
everyone would like to become entrepreneur but only those with a  k   C1 can do so.
Hence, we would have ne = 1   F(k   C1) and so
dne
dC1




The total eect of changing C1 and C2 in this setting depends on the fraction of
the population who can optimally choose its savings, for which equation (8) holds, and
the fraction who face binding borrowing constraints, for which equation (9) holds. Still,
by (8) and (9), we can say that in general the share of self-employed in period 1 is
more responsive to the amount of period 1 transfers than to period 2 transfers. Current
transfers help to overcome liquidity needs, while future transfers may not be pledged for
obtaining cash in period 1 so as to incur the investment.
114.1.3 Insurance constraints
We now abstract from liquidity constraints by assuming k = 0: In this case, all individuals
who are suciently tolerant toward risk become self-employed, i.e. ne = G(r). As in the
previous section, those who can optimally decide their savings see no dierence between
current and future transfers. To see the eects on those who face binding borrowing
constraints, instead, notice that for sw = 0 it must be that
u
0
(a + C1) > u
0
(w + C2); (10)
and for se = 0 it must be that
u
0
(a + C1) > pu
0
(y + C2) + (1   p)u
0
(C2): (11)
These individuals, even by not saving, are consuming too little in the rst period (as
they would like to borrow). Consider rst those for whom both (10) and (11) hold. By











where dr=dC2 > 0 follows from the fact that u is DARA and so increasing C2 increases
risk-taking through a classic wealth eect (Pratt [1964]). Those for whom only (10)
holds set se > 0 and sw = 0 and they too are more responsive to future than to current
transfers. This can be shown by substituting sw = 0 into (4) and (5) and combining (7)
and (10).11
As in the previous section, the eect of changing C1 and C2 depends on the fraction
of the population who can optimally set its savings and the fraction for whom borrowing
constraints bind. Still, we can say that, in this setting, the share of self-employed in
period 1 is more responsive to period 2 than to period 1 transfers. The reasons is that, in
order to self-insure, households need to dispose of enough wealth in period 2. Those with
binding borrowing constraints consume all their wealth in period 1 (and still they would
prefer consuming more). Hence, increasing C1 does not make them richer in period 2 and
so does not aect their willingness to take risk. As a summary of the above results, we
state the following Proposition.
11Notice that no individual who is marginal in the occupational choice sets se = 0 and sw > 0. In
fact, due to DARA utility, we have u
0
(s + w + C2) < pu
0
(s + y + C2) + (1   p)u
0
(s + C2) when E = 0.
Hence, imposing sw = se = s would imply that this individual saves too much when salaried and so he
would always set se  sw.
12Proposition 1 Suppose individuals face constraints in allocating transfers across peri-
ods. Then current occupational choices are more responsive to the size of current transfers
if liquidity constraints bind, while they are more responsive to the size of future transfers
if insurance constraints bind.
As a nal remark notice that, for simplicity of exposition, we have modeled constraints
in allocating transfers across periods only as borrowing constraints. It may also be the
case that households face saving constraints, as the result of present-biased preferences
(Ashraf, Karlan and Yin [2006], Dupas and Robinson [2009], Banerjee and Mullainathan
[2010]), social norms (Platteau [2000]), or simply unavailability of a safe storage technol-
ogy (Collins et al. [2009] and Karlan and Morduch [2009]). As intuitive, Proposition 1
would hold also in this case. In fact, in case of liquidity constraints, saving constraints
are never binding so equation (8) applies; in case of insurance constraints, individuals
cannot transfer wealth from period 1 to period 2 and so they are insensitive to C1.
4.2 Empirical Strategy
In what follows, we restrict our attention to eligible individuals who reside in treated
villages and were salaried at the baseline.12 We are then interested in evaluating how
individual i's probability to become entrepreneur at time t depends on the cumulative
amount of transfers received by the household in the previous period and on the transfers
known to be received in the next period. In most of our analysis, we dene such a period
as six months since that corresponds to the shortest time frame such that future transfers
are systematically dierent from current transfers according to the school calendar year.
In robustness checks, we consider dierent time horizons.13
Beside being possibly measured with error, the actual amounts received partly depend
on households' behaviors in complying with the program's conditions and these are likely
to be simultaneously determined with occupational choices. We thus dene potential
transfers Ph;t and Ph;t+1 as the amount of transfers a household would be entitled to,
according to the rules described in Section 2, assuming that its children did not change
their pre-program enrollment decisions and, when enrolled, progressed by one grade in
each year. These transfers are deterministic functions of children's characteristics at the
baseline and by construction they are uncorrelated with any behavioral response to the
12Unemployment seems unlikely to be driven by risk preferences in this setting.
13Since we do not know exactly the date in which individuals have changed occupation between two
survey waves, current and future transfers are constructed by taking the month of the interview as
the reference. It follows that our future amounts are certainly received after individuals have changed
occupation, while part of our current amounts may sometimes still be due at the time in which they
switch occupation. If this were the case, our estimates on the dierential eects of future vs. current
transfers should be interpreted as a lower bound.
13program. Motivated by Proposition 1, we then consider the following empirical model
which employs alternatively current and future potential transfers as explanatory variable:
nei;t = 1Ph;t + Child
0
h;t1 + i;t; (13)
nei;t = 2Ph;t+1 + Child
0
h;t2 + ui;t: (14)
The vector Childh;t contains age-specic categorical variables for the number of boys and
girls who are between 6 and 17 years old in each household h and post-treatment period
t, which controls for any independent eect of children demographics on occupational
choices. We further directly test whether current and future transfers have a dierential
impact on the probability to become entrepreneur and so estimate:
nei;t = 3Ph;t+1 + 4 [Ph;t+1 + Ph;t] + Child
0
h;t3 + h;t: (15)
In this specication, our coecient of interest is 3, which measures the dierential
impact of future vs. current transfers (i.e. @nei;t=@Ph;t+1   @nei;t=@Ph;t).
In equations (13)-(15), both the level and the time prole of potential transfers may
vary across households with identical compositions in terms of children age and gender
since these children may dier in their attainment level or enrollment status at the base-
line. Indeed, in terms of attainment, due to grade repetition and/or early enrollment
in school, on average 65% of the students enrolled within the seven program grades are
either younger or older than they would be had they started school at the age of six
and proceeded thereafter without setback. Also, in terms of enrollment status, about
90% of children at the baseline are enrolled at the primary level, but only 60% of the
boys and 48% of the girls are enrolled at the junior secondary level. Notice also that,
since households have typically several eligible children, in many instances these sources
of variations in transfers may co-exist within the same family.14
These patterns are represented in Figure 1, which reports a scatter plot of per-child
monthly educational transfers a household is entitled to receive as a function of the age,
gender and baseline schooling status of the child. As described in Section 2, monthly
scholarships amount to 81 Pesos per child enrolled in the third grade and they increase
for each grade up to the ninth. Hence, a child who starts school at the age of six
and progresses by one grade per year is entitled to receive 81 Pesos at the age of eight
and then an increasing amount of transfers up to age fourteen. This is represented by
the solid line which we call "theoretical". Deviations from these theoretical amounts
come from children who are not enrolled in school at baseline, as described by the dots
14On average, each household has 3.5 children (less than 18 years old), of which about 2 are eligible
to receive the educational scholarship in a given year.
14associated with zero amounts, and by children of a given age attending dierent school
grades at the baseline, as described by the remaining dots. In order to shed light on the
relative importance of these dierent sources of variation, the gure reports larger dots
for observations with higher sample frequency.
The key identifying assumption for estimating the eects of Ph;t+1 and Ph;t in the above
specications is that, absent the program, occupational choices respond to children's
demographics and not to their baseline attainment level or enrollment status. In order
to test this assumption, we look at two alternative placebo samples: program-eligible
households living in control villages and non-eligible households living in treated villages.
We construct the transfers they would have been entitled to had they been treated, and
estimate the eect of these placebo potential transfers on occupational choices. As shown
in Table 7, there are no eects of Ph;t+1 and Ph;t in these samples. We can then rule out
that the very same household characteristics which determine the prole of transfers
determine also occupational choices and so proceed in estimating the eects of current
and future transfers among treated households.
4.3 Results
In order to rst provide a visual inspection of our relationships of interest, we estimate
equations (13) and (14) non-parametrically using local linear regressions. As shown
in Figure 2, the shape of the curves suggests that transfers received in the previous
six months do not have any eect on the probability to become entrepreneur. On the
contrary, this probability seems to depend positively on the amount of transfers that
households are entitled to receive in the next six months.
These patterns are conrmed in standard probit estimations. In Table 8, we report
the marginal eects of current and future cash transfers (in thousand Pesos) on the
likelihood to switch from salaried work to self-employment. Column (1) displays the
results for the amounts received in the previous six months, which reveal no signicant
eects. According to column (2), instead, the eect of the transfers a household is entitled
to receive in the next six months appears signicant and large: a one standard deviation
increase in future transfers increases the average probability to become entrepreneur by
1.2%.15 This amounts to a 12% increase vis- a-vis the average share of new entrepreneurs
in this sample (9.6%).
In order to directly estimate any dierential impact of current vs. future transfers,
we then turn to the specication (15), in which such dierential eect is captured by the
coecient 3. As shown in column (3), 3 is positive and signicant, which shows that
15The average potential transfers received in the past six months are 1446 Pesos (std. dev. 863) and
the average potential transfers to be received in the next six months are 1553 Pesos (std. dev. 964).
15the probability to become entrepreneur is signicantly more responsive to the amount
of future transfers than to the amount of current transfers. We then test whether this
pattern holds once we control for the total amount of transfers received in the previous
six months and on those to be received in the next six months. In column (4), we
show that an increasing stream of transfers is more likely to promote entrepreneurship,
which conrms the result in column (3). Also, having higher total transfers increases the
probability to switch to self-employment (column 5). However, including both the total
amount of transfers and their time prole, we see that only the latter matters (column
6). Future transfers matter more than current transfers even when we control for their
total amount.
We further perform some specication checks. We rst investigate whether our es-
timates may be driven by some specic relation between the total amount of transfers
received and to be received from the program and the time prole of these transfers. In
column (1) of Table 9, we consider the cumulative amounts received in the last year (as
opposed to six months as in the previous specication) and see no signicant change.
In column (2), we consider the total amount of transfers potentially received between
March 1998 and September 2000, which we call the medium run. This corresponds to the
longest time period for which we can compute potential transfers without making further
assumptions on the schooling decisions of those who were ve years old at the baseline.
In column (3), we control for the total amount of transfers potentially received according
to the baseline children demographics (including children of all ages) assuming that all
children go to school at the age of six, they progress one grade per year, and the program
continues unchanged throughout. This is a (rough) measure of the total income shock
an household expects to receive in the long run based on its baseline composition. The
coecients associated to these total amounts are very small and not signicant (as one
would expect in a setting in which future wealth cannot be pledged for current wealth),
while the estimated coecients on the time prole of the transfers barely change.
Finally, in columns (4)-(6), we dene the time prole with a one year horizon instead of
six months. Results are consistent with the previous ones: current transfers do not matter
while future transfers do, even though estimates tend to be less precise. In magnitude,
the relative eects for one year future transfers are similar to those for six months: a one
standard deviation increase leads to 0.9% more self-employed, which is a 10% increase.
Taken together, these results suggest that the time prole of the transfer is key for
explaining occupational choices in our setting. As further suggestive evidence, we notice
that the magnitude of these eects is consistent with the reduced-form treatment impacts
described in Section 3, in spite of the fact that they arise from two potentially dierent
sources of variation. For salaried individuals in treated villages, the treatment increases
16the probability to become entrepreneur by 1.5% with respect to the control group (see
Table 2, column 4), while a standard deviation increase in future transfers increases such
probability by 1.2%.
5 Conclusion
We have explored the response of occupational choices to the income shocks induced by
the Mexican program Progresa. We have rst documented that the probability to become
entrepreneur increases by about 20% for treated individuals. We have then shown that
current occupational choices are signicantly more responsive to the amount of transfers
expected for the future than to the amount of transfers currently received. Moreover,
according to our estimates, the dierential impact of future vs. current transfers is
comparable in magnitude to the treated-control dierence, which conrms that the time
prole of the transfers is key in explaining the program eects. We have interpreted these
results as evidence that in our setting the cash transfers have been eective in promoting
entrepreneurship as they have enhanced the willingness to bear risk as opposed to simply
relaxing current liquidity constraints.
Our results feature some limitations. For example, little is known on the long run
eects of these dynamics. As mentioned, a study by Gertler, Martinez and Rubio-Codina
[2006] shows that productive investments induced by Progresa had persistent eects on
individual welfare. We conjecture that changes in occupational choices are likely to
display similar features, but a detailed analysis of this issue is left to further investigation.
Moreover, we have not fully addressed the possibility of general equilibrium eects induced
by the program. As a rst step, we have shown that indirect eects on non-eligible
households in treated communities are not signicant. However, we cannot say whether
the above described dynamics are only improving the welfare of those who have changed
occupation (as it appears in Table 5), or they are also altering the functioning of some
markets (e.g. in terms of increased labor demand or total production).
Nonetheless, we think our analysis can inform the debate on nancial constraints and
entrepreneurship in developing countries. First, while some skeptics question whether
policy makers can promote entrepreneurship at all (see e.g. Holtz-Eakin [2000], Parker
[2007], Shane [2009] for a discussion), we have shown one instance in which this could be
done. Second, according to our estimates, nancial barriers to entry into entrepreneur-
ship do not seem insurmountable. Instead, a major barrier may come from the risky
prospects self-employment oers. In this view, promoting entrepreneurship requires re-
ducing households' exposure to risk in other dimensions.
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20Tables and Figures
Table 1: Baseline Characteristics and Covariate Balance
Variable Mean Std. Dev. T-C Di. t-test
Main Occupation
Self-Employed 0.074 0.262 0.019 1.62
Unemployed 0.534 0.499 -0.005 -0.51
Salaried 0.392 0.488 -0.013 -1.22
Individual Characteristics
Age 39.263 13.877 -0.254 -0.65
Female 0.541 0.498 0.006 1.09
Income Main Occup. 247.445 344.452 -11.243 -1.29
Income Other Occup. 56.354 339.52 -4.599 -0.72
Labor Supply 20.054 23.148 -0.002 -0.01
Years of Education 2.707 2.628 0.068 0.51
Household's Assets
Asset Index (Score) 638.14 82.489 0.399 0.23
Land Used 1.219 2.697 -0.071 -0.62
Land Owned 0.561 0.496 0.028 0.97
Working Animals 0.318 0.466 0.025 1.10
Household's Composition
Female HH Head 0.048 0.213 -0.004 -0.46
child05 0.700 0.458 -0.003 -0.19
child612 0.708 0.455 -0.014 -1.20
child1315 0.394 0.489 -0.011 -0.76
child1621 0.370 0.483 0.003 0.35
men2139 0.606 0.489 0.002 0.16
men4059 0.352 0.478 -0.002 -0.17
men60 0.128 0.334 0.002 0.11
women2139 0.692 0.462 -0.014 -0.74
women4059 0.295 0.456 -0.003 -0.43
women60 0.125 0.33 -0.002 -0.29
Locality Characteristics
Number of Shocks 1.62 1.088 -0.036 -0.69
Share of Entrepreneurs 0.092 0.086 0.003 -0.18
Crop Diversication 2.336 0.705 -0.014 1.41
Note: This table presents baseline summary statistics for the
treatment and control groups and the two-sided t-test that the
dierence in means is statistically signicantly dierent from zero;
standard errors are clustered at the village level.
21Table 2: Probability to Become Entrepreneur: Average Treatment Impacts
Sample All Former Salaried Former Unemployed
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Treat 0.009 0.007 0.017 0.015 0.006 0.004
(0.004)*** (0.003)*** (0.008)** (0.008)* (0.003)** (0.002)**
Mean Dep. Var. 0.037 0.074 0.016
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
State Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Wave Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo R-squared 0.033 0.124 0.040 0.055 0.046 0.199
Number of Obs 47219 46271 17421 17094 26680 26154
Number of Localities 504 500 496 492 504 500
Note: This table reports probit marginal eects of the program on the probability to become en-
trepreneur. * denotes signicance at 10%; ** signicance at 5%; *** signicance at 1%. Standard
errors are clustered at the village level. Baseline control variables include age, age squared, years
of education, gender, income (labor and other sources), households' demographics, assets (land and
animals), welfare index (score) and villages' main economic activity, agricultural shocks, crop diver-
sication and share of entrepreneurs.
22Table 3: Probability to Become Entrepreneur: Placebo
Sample Eligibles Non Eligibles













Controls No Yes No Yes
State Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Wave Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Obs 78115 76560 15464 15148
Pseudo R-squared 0.034 0.128 0.02 0.13
Number of Localities 505 501 450 445
Note: This table reports probit marginal eects of the program on the
probability to become entrepreneur. * denotes signicance at 10%; **
signicance at 5%; *** signicance at 1%. Standard errors are clustered
at the village level. Baseline control variables include age, age squared,
years of education, gender, income (labor and other sources), house-
holds' demographics, assets (land and animals), welfare index (score)
and villages' main economic activity, agricultural shocks, crop diversi-
cation and share of entrepreneurs.
23Table 4: Baseline Characteristics and Conditionality

















Treat 0.012 0.013 0.018 0.012
(0.020) (0.008) (0.010)* (0.021)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
State Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Wave Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Obs 16966 17094 12630 8744
Pseudo R-squared 0.055 0.056 0.056 0.054
Number of Localities 492 492 488 480
Note: This table reports probit marginal eects of the program on
the probability to become entrepreneur. The variable Labor measures
the number of hours worked at the baseline; the variable Non Enroll is
a dummy equal one if the household has eligible children not enrolled
in school at the baseline; the variable Prim Sec is a dummy equal
one if the household has children in primary school age and zero if
the household has female children in secondary school age. * denotes
signicance at 10%; ** signicance at 5%; *** signicance at 1%.
Standard errors are clustered at the village level. Baseline control
variables include age, age squared, years of education, gender, income
(labor and other sources), households' demographics, assets (land and
animals), welfare index (score) and villages' main economic activity,
agricultural shocks, crop diversication and share of entrepreneurs.
24Table 5: Welfare and Labor Supply
Dependent Variable Labor Earn Non-food Exp Food Cons Hrs Work Days Work Sec Occup
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Treat*New Entrep 17.389 33.003 12.552 0.044 -0.085 -0.117
(8.055)** (13.944)** (9.755) (0.193) (0.179) (0.055)**
Treat -3.902 16.770 17.950 -0.017 -0.038 -0.010
(4.039) (7.512)** (5.452)*** (0.034) (0.041) (0.009)
New Entrep -77.698 -22.441 -9.414 -0.169 -0.219 0.235
(6.074)*** (11.756)* (8.160) (0.143) (0.134) (0.045)***
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Wave Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Obs 32988 33036 30863 10441 15219 10763
R-squared 0.152 0.120 0.030 0.020 0.032 0.051
Number of Localities 494 495 495 488 488 483
Note: This table reports OLS estimates of the program on labor earnings (column 1), non-food expen-
ditures (column 2), food consumption (column 3), hours worked (column 4), days worked (column 5) and
on the probability to be engaged in a second paid occupation (column 5). * denotes signicance at 10%;
** signicance at 5%; *** signicance at 1%. Standard errors are clustered at the village level. Baseline
control variables include age, age squared, years of education, gender, income (labor and other sources),
households' demographics, assets (land and animals), welfare index (score) and villages' main economic
activity, agricultural shocks, crop diversication and share of entrepreneurs.
25Table 6: Investments
Dependent Variable Carpenter Handicraft Agri Expend Animal Agri Product Land
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Treat*New Entrep 0.012 0.048 56.983 30.883 -3.946 -0.037
(0.004)*** (0.021)** (57.937) (34.977) (8.337) (0.044)
Treat -0.005 0.010 -50.395 0.841 -6.583 0.044
(0.004) (0.006)* (34.229) (2.347) (4.477) (0.023)*
New Entrep -0.003 0.028 -112.147 2.738 5.423 0.083
(0.002) (0.010)*** (51.669)** (8.525) (5.832) (0.034)**
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Wave Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Obs 53195 53195 15996 17584 15617 35333
R-squared 0.038 0.094 0.079 0.006 0.009 0.081
Number of Localities 503 503 481 497 497 497
Note: This table reports OLS estimates of the program on the probability to be engaged in carpentry
(column 1) and handicraft (column 2); on agricultural expenditures (column 3), animal stocks (column
4), agricultural production (column 5) and land owned or used (column 5). * denotes signicance at
10%; ** signicance at 5%; *** signicance at 1%. Standard errors are clustered at the village level.
Baseline control variables include age, age squared, years of education, gender, income (labor and other
sources), households' demographics, assets (land and animals), welfare index (score) and villages' main
economic activity, agricultural shocks, crop diversication and share of entrepreneurs.
26Figure 1: Potential Transfers per Child
 
Note: This gure shows the variation of per-child monthly transfers a household is entitled to receive
as a function of the age and the gender of the child. The solid "theoretical" line represents the monthly
amount an household receives for each child who starts school at the age of six and progresses by one
grade per year. Deviations from these theoretical amounts come from children who are not enrolled in
school at the baseline, as described by the dots associated with zero amounts, and by children of a given
age attending dierent school grades at baseline, as described by the remaining dots. The size of the
markers have been adjusted for the relative sample frequency. Amounts are expressed in current Pesos
as of the second semester of 1998.
27Table 7: Current and Future Transfers: Placebo
Sample Poor in Control Villages Non-poor in Treated Villages
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Current (6 months) -0.0004 -0.0002
(0.0072) (0.0151)
Future (6 months) -0.0071 -0.0077
(0.0063) (0.0153)
Future (1 year) -0.0025 -0.0050
(0.0033) (0.0089)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Wave Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Obs 6814 6814 6814 2846 2846 2846
Pseudo R-squared 0.038 0.039 0.039 0.038 0.038 0.038
Number of Localities 181 181 181 255 255 255
Note: This table reports probit marginal eects of the transfers (in thousand Pesos) on
the probability to become entrepreneur. Standard errors are clustered at the village level.
Control variables include age-specic categorical variables for the number of boys and girls
between 6 and 17 years old.
28Figure 2: Current and Future Transfers: Non-parametric Estimates
Note: This gure shows non-parametric estimates (based on Local Linear Regression Smoothers) of
the eect of current and future transfer amounts on the probability to become entrepreneur.
29Table 8: Current and Future Transfers: Six Months Horizon







Future+Current -0.023 0.005 0.004
(0.009)** (0.002)** (0.002)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Wave Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Obs 10607 10607 10607 10607 10607 10607
Pseudo R-squared 0.051 0.052 0.052 0.051 0.052 0.051
Number of Localities 315 315 315 315 315 315
Note: This table reports probit marginal eects of the transfers (in thousand Pesos) on the probability
to become entrepreneur. * denotes signicance at 10%; ** signicance at 5%; *** signicance at 1%.
Standard errors are clustered at the village level. Control variables include age-specic categorical
variables for the number of boys and girls between 6 and 17 years old.
30Table 9: Current and Future Transfers: Robustness
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Future-Current (6 months) 0.029 0.030 0.030
(0.009)*** (0.009)*** (0.009)***
Current (1 year) 0.004 0.003
(0.002) (0.002)
Total (medium run) -0.0001
(0.0001)
Total (long run) -0.00005
(0.00004)
Future (1 year) 0.005 0.016
(0.002)** (0.011)
Future+Current (1 year) -0.006
(0.006)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Wave Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Obs 10607 10607 10607 10607 10607 10607
Pseudo R-squared 0.052 0.055 0.055 0.051 0.051 0.051
Number of Localities 315 315 315 315 315 315
Note: This table reports probit marginal eects of the transfers on the probability to become en-
trepreneur. Amounts are expressed in thousand Pesos, except for Total (long run) which is in 100 thousand
Pesos. * denotes signicance at 10%; ** signicance at 5%; *** signicance at 1%. Standard errors are
clustered at the village level. Control variables include age-specic categorical variables for the number
of boys and girls between 6 and 17 years old (in columns 1,4,5,6) and between 1 and 17 years old (in
columns 2,3).
31